
๐๐ผ ๐๐ฒ ๐๐ฎ๐ป๐ ๐ถ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ถ๐บ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฏ๐ถ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐ โ ๐ผ๐ฟ โ๐ณ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐น๐โ ๐ผ๐ป๐ฒ๐?
One issue from our discussion at the FAI 115th Anniversary Conference in Helsinki deserves a broader conversation.
Russia formally classifies States as โfriendlyโ and โunfriendlyโ. International arbitration does not. Yet I am concerned that this distinction is finding its way into arbitration through the back door.
We have seen challenges against arbitrators based on their nationality or expressions of support for Ukraine โ statements, signatures, publications or even social media activity.
Another development is troubling.
In disputes involving Russian parties โ State or private โ considerations of whether candidates come from States Russia regards as โfriendlyโ or โunfriendlyโ are finding their way into institutional appointments of sole arbitrators and tribunal presidents.
๐๐ฟ๐ฒ ๐๐ฒ ๐น๐ผ๐ผ๐ธ๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ถ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ถ๐บ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฏ๐ถ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ผ๐ฟ โ ๐ผ๐ฟ ๐ผ๐ป๐ฒ ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ฐ๐๐ฒ๐ฑ ๐๐ผ ๐ฏ๐ฒ โ๐ณ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐น๐โ?
An arbitrator does not represent the State of their nationality and should not be presumed to share its foreign policy. Equally, acknowledging Russiaโs aggression against Ukraine should not in itself be evidence of bias. The UN General Assembly has expressly characterised it as aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.
There may be a pragmatic explanation. Russian courts have relied on connections with โunfriendlyโ States to refuse enforcement. Institutions may therefore seek to reduce challenge or enforcement risks.
But there are ๐๐๐ผ ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฒ๐ to an arbitration.
Why should the geopolitical classification adopted by the home State of one party influence the constitution of the tribunal? Why should the other party accept a tribunal constituted with a view to accommodating the first partyโs concept of โfriendlinessโ?
In Helsinki I put it more bluntly: ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฏ๐ถ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐น ๐ถ๐ป๐๐๐ถ๐๐๐๐ถ๐ผ๐ป๐ ๐๐ต๐ผ๐๐น๐ฑ ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐๐ฟ๐ ๐๐ผ ๐ฝ๐น๐ฒ๐ฎ๐๐ฒ ๐ฅ๐๐๐๐ถ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฒ๐ ๐ฏ๐ ๐ฎ๐ฐ๐ฐ๐ผ๐บ๐บ๐ผ๐ฑ๐ฎ๐๐ถ๐ป๐ด ๐ฑ๐ฒ๐บ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ๐ ๐ณ๐ผ๐ฟ โ๐ณ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐น๐โ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฏ๐ถ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ผ๐ฟ๐.
Russian parties are entitled to the same procedural protections as everyone else: due process and independent and impartial arbitrators.
But they are not entitled to preferential treatment โ or to โfriendlyโ arbitrators.
This goes far beyond Russia.
If geopolitical โfriendlinessโ becomes an acceptable consideration in selecting arbitrators, what happens in the next war, sanctions regime or geopolitical conflict?
We risk replacing a system based on qualifications, independence and impartiality with one divided into โfriendlyโ and โunfriendlyโ arbitrators.
๐ง๐ต๐ฒ ๐ฎ๐ป๐๐๐ฒ๐ฟ ๐๐ผ ๐ฎ๐ป โ๐๐ป๐ณ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐น๐โ ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐ฏ๐ถ๐๐ฟ๐ฎ๐๐ผ๐ฟ ๐ถ๐ ๐ป๐ผ๐ ๐ฎ โ๐ณ๐ฟ๐ถ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐น๐โ ๐ผ๐ป๐ฒ. ๐๐ ๐ถ๐ ๐ฎ๐ป ๐ถ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ฝ๐ฒ๐ป๐ฑ๐ฒ๐ป๐ ๐ฎ๐ป๐ฑ ๐ถ๐บ๐ฝ๐ฎ๐ฟ๐๐ถ๐ฎ๐น ๐ผ๐ป๐ฒ.