FAI 115th Anniversary Conference in Helsinki

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August 21, 2026

๐——๐—ผ ๐˜„๐—ฒ ๐˜„๐—ฎ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜€ โ€“ ๐—ผ๐—ฟ โ€œ๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—น๐˜†โ€ ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฒ๐˜€?

One issue from our discussion at the FAI 115th Anniversary Conference in Helsinki deserves a broader conversation.

Russia formally classifies States as โ€œfriendlyโ€ and โ€œunfriendlyโ€. International arbitration does not. Yet I am concerned that this distinction is finding its way into arbitration through the back door.

We have seen challenges against arbitrators based on their nationality or expressions of support for Ukraine โ€“ statements, signatures, publications or even social media activity.

Another development is troubling.

In disputes involving Russian parties โ€“ State or private โ€“ considerations of whether candidates come from States Russia regards as โ€œfriendlyโ€ or โ€œunfriendlyโ€ are finding their way into institutional appointments of sole arbitrators and tribunal presidents.

๐—”๐—ฟ๐—ฒ ๐˜„๐—ฒ ๐—น๐—ผ๐—ผ๐—ธ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ โ€“ ๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฒ ๐—ฒ๐˜…๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ฐ๐˜๐—ฒ๐—ฑ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฏ๐—ฒ โ€œ๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—น๐˜†โ€?

An arbitrator does not represent the State of their nationality and should not be presumed to share its foreign policy. Equally, acknowledging Russiaโ€™s aggression against Ukraine should not in itself be evidence of bias. The UN General Assembly has expressly characterised it as aggression in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter.

There may be a pragmatic explanation. Russian courts have relied on connections with โ€œunfriendlyโ€ States to refuse enforcement. Institutions may therefore seek to reduce challenge or enforcement risks.

But there are ๐˜๐˜„๐—ผ ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐˜€ to an arbitration.

Why should the geopolitical classification adopted by the home State of one party influence the constitution of the tribunal? Why should the other party accept a tribunal constituted with a view to accommodating the first partyโ€™s concept of โ€œfriendlinessโ€?

In Helsinki I put it more bluntly: ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ถ๐—ป๐˜€๐˜๐—ถ๐˜๐˜‚๐˜๐—ถ๐—ผ๐—ป๐˜€ ๐˜€๐—ต๐—ผ๐˜‚๐—น๐—ฑ ๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜ ๐˜๐—ฟ๐˜† ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฝ๐—น๐—ฒ๐—ฎ๐˜€๐—ฒ ๐—ฅ๐˜‚๐˜€๐˜€๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐˜€ ๐—ฏ๐˜† ๐—ฎ๐—ฐ๐—ฐ๐—ผ๐—บ๐—บ๐—ผ๐—ฑ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ด ๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—บ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐˜€ ๐—ณ๐—ผ๐—ฟ โ€œ๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—น๐˜†โ€ ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ๐˜€.

Russian parties are entitled to the same procedural protections as everyone else: due process and independent and impartial arbitrators.

But they are not entitled to preferential treatment โ€“ or to โ€œfriendlyโ€ arbitrators.

This goes far beyond Russia.

If geopolitical โ€œfriendlinessโ€ becomes an acceptable consideration in selecting arbitrators, what happens in the next war, sanctions regime or geopolitical conflict?

We risk replacing a system based on qualifications, independence and impartiality with one divided into โ€œfriendlyโ€ and โ€œunfriendlyโ€ arbitrators.

๐—ง๐—ต๐—ฒ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐˜€๐˜„๐—ฒ๐—ฟ ๐˜๐—ผ ๐—ฎ๐—ป โ€œ๐˜‚๐—ป๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—น๐˜†โ€ ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐—ฏ๐—ถ๐˜๐—ฟ๐—ฎ๐˜๐—ผ๐—ฟ ๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ป๐—ผ๐˜ ๐—ฎ โ€œ๐—ณ๐—ฟ๐—ถ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—น๐˜†โ€ ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฒ. ๐—œ๐˜ ๐—ถ๐˜€ ๐—ฎ๐—ป ๐—ถ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ฝ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐—ฑ๐—ฒ๐—ป๐˜ ๐—ฎ๐—ป๐—ฑ ๐—ถ๐—บ๐—ฝ๐—ฎ๐—ฟ๐˜๐—ถ๐—ฎ๐—น ๐—ผ๐—ป๐—ฒ.